

Editorial

Let's be Clear: A Call for Tripartite Action-Actor-Motivation Conceptualisations in Social-Scientific Research ¹


Caspar ten Dam

The Chief Editor Dr. Babak Rezvani, who is busily engaged as a Lecturer in Tblisi, Georgia, sends his greetings: “We are happy to announce the new issue of our journal. We have entered our third year of professional existence. These three years the world has provided us with many examples of why ethnogeopolitics is important as a discipline. Of course it is unfortunate that the many conflicts—e.g. in Ukraine, Sudan, Yemen, Syria and Iraq—have occurred, but nevertheless their occurrence is another indication of the relevance and necessity of the study of ethnogeopolitics in current world affairs.”

Introduction

This Editorial—which can be considered as a follow-up and elaboration on a section in my Editorial on patriotism in the journal's preceding issue (Ten Dam 2014: esp. 6-8)—describes my principles on how best to define *any* concepts and phenomena in time and space in the social sciences (not just in the field of ethnogeopolitics, though it is especially relevant and useful to that field). These principles revolve around my tripartite distinction between *action*, *actor* and *motive* or human drive. The consequent conceptualisations I apply in my own research on *brutalisation* i.e. the increasing resort to terrorism, ‘brigandry’ (brigandage), gangsterism and other forms of violence (see Appendix)¹ violating local and/or international norms—norms that are ultimately based on conscience, empathy and honour (Ten Dam 2014: 8-9).

I have constructed a Brutalisation theory, consisting of the variables *violence-values* (my composite term), *conflict-inducing motivations* (grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies) leading up to the conflict, *combat-stresses* leading to trauma's (and perhaps brutalities); and *conflict-induced motivations* (grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies) during the conflict; I first seek to first falsify i.e. test the theory on the methods (actions), aims and values (motives) of Chechen and Albanian separatists (actors) between 1979 and 2001 during the late Cold War and early post-Cold war periods.² These variables, their theoretical and disciplinary backgrounds, and preliminary findings on the values, aims and methods among Chechen and Albanian insurgents, are described in my “How to Feud and Rebel” Series in the peer-reviewed journal *Iran and the Caucasus* (Ten Dam 2010, 2011, 2012).³



Conceptualisation: distinguishing actions, actors and motives

Proud Chechens and Albanians may object to the terms 'rebellion' and 'terrorism' for describing their resistance to foreign rule. Chechens still resisting Moscow consider themselves part of a legitimate if underground Chechen state. My concept of *rebellion* (see the Appendix) is a neutral one; it does not denote or presume illegality or illegitimacy. Neither do I regard revolution, idealism, ideology and indoctrination as inevitable, universal characteristics of 'real' or 'sophisticated' rebellion, revolt or insurgency (partially or fully interchangeable terms for the same rebellion concept in the Appendix). My definition of insurgency/rebellion/revolt is even broader than J. Bowyer Bell's, who states that "in a revolt the rebel abrogates previous authority by recourse to armed force in an effort to seize power in the name of a denied legitimacy" (Bell 1976: 5).⁴


Insurgency as I circumscribe it thus entails violent opposition to the ruler, government regime or state for any personal, collective or ideological purpose. A rebel movement, of course, may aim to form, and succeed in forming, a government and seek international recognition. So-called *irredentist* rebels (though irredentists can be state actors too) are the expansionist and often more aggressive variant of secessionist nationalists, given their territorial claims across existing state borders.

I circumscribe *ethnicity* or *ethnic identity* as the belief among a group of people (and possibly external observers) that they have common tribal, genealogical, and/or mythical ancestries, here classified as a sub-type of *nationalism* (see Appendix). In practice numerous countries exhibit combinations of nationalism, patriotism and republicanism (also called civic nationalism) in, for instance, written constitutions of states and declarations of armed non-state actors like rebel movements.

Similarly, I refuse to presume that nationalisms are always secular in orientation. In current and future research one must for instance ascertain whether Muslim rebels having emerged from the rubbles of, say, the Afghan, Soviet, and Yugoslav states have followed genuine, 'pure' Islamist goals, rather than nationalist-secular ones in which religion is only co-opted as part of a strategy to attain nationhood.

Fundamentalism and nationalism are not necessarily mutually exclusive phenomena, however. Berna Turam rightly criticises the artificial "polarisation between culture-centered and state-centered theories of nationalism" whereby the first school of thought perceives religious revivalism as characteristic of non- or anti-state movements, and the latter school regards nationalism as a solely secular ideology; this false dichotomy obscures the "links between ethnicity, revivalist Islam and the nation-state" (Turam 2004: 353-354; see Ten Dam 2011: 241).

Crucially, one should not define central concepts like terrorism by empirical, changeable phenomena. Motives and goals alter over time. Perpetrators use violence against civilians—a rare common element in terrorism definitions—for any conceivable reason. One must



continuously modify such empirical definitions if one wishes to encapsulate any new trend. Instead, one better could construct one's main concepts as ideal-types or *Gedankenbilder* and classify their real-time, fluctuating manifestations as subtypes (Weber, apud Shils & Finch 1949: esp. 90). I, like some other scholars (Ganor, Schmid etc.), agree with the following point that Raymond D. Duvall and Michael Stohl have made at one stage in their analysis:

Motives are .. irrelevant to the concept of .. terrorism. Most analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss .. motives as logical or necessary aspects .. . But they are not. At best, they are empirical regularities associated with terrorism. More often, they simply confuse analysis (Ganor 2002: 10 (update 2010: note 10); Schmid & Jongman *et al.* 1984 Edit: 100).⁵


I also agree with the more general point Boaz Ganor has made recently: "I genuinely believe that defining terrorism is both crucial and possible, and because I believe that once terrorism has been consensually defined, that definition will become a pillar of much better and more effective international cooperation on counter-terrorism" (Ganor 2013: 1).

My terrorism definition covers certain human rights violations such as sudden kidnappings and killings of non-combatants.⁶ Alex Schmid identifies such violations as manifestations of terrorism when and for so far these violations constitute deliberate violence tactics against unarmed people (Schmid 2005: 28-29). Mass killings, which might constitute genocide if directed against an entire group or population, may also be seen as a form of terrorism. Generally, the best approach is to first define violent actors by what they do (behaviour), not what they supposedly want or believe (ideology).⁷ Fortunately more analysts have come to share this view.

Better still, always separate the universally possible action (method) from the temporarily existing actor (person or persons) and thought (objective). This tripartite distinction—and the heated debate that may ensue—can be fruitful, even if it concerns *essentially contested concepts* involving "endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users" (Gallie 1956: 169). We "do need, ultimately, "universal" categories—concepts that are applicable to any time and place" (Sartori 1970: 1035).

Naturally, all definitions are imperfect and arbitrary in the sense of their demarcations and delineations, due to either implicit, perhaps subconscious assumptions or preferably explicit, well-argued suppositions. Nevertheless, I have developed the following conceptual principles in circumscribing and distinguishing all kinds of phenomena, which I proposition in my forthcoming book *Conceptualising Brutality and Violence* as follows:

It is best to a) base primary concepts on observable actions by humans and other (sentient) organisms that may occur at any point in time; b) base secondary concepts on observable actors i.e. individuals and groups of humans or other sentient beings; and c) base tertiary concepts on more elusive and fluctuating drives, motives and beliefs of actors across certain points in time—even if the latter two categories involve deeper analysis of the reasons why 'action-phenomena' occur (cited in Ten Dam 2014: 7).



As a rule of thumb (and again I cite from *Conceptualising Brutality and Violence*), “I classify phenomena of action, like the *methods* of violence regarding tactics and techniques, and *means* of violence regarding targets and lethal and non-lethal use of weaponry, as main or primary *universal concepts*; phenomena of actor-identity, like the *forms* of violence regarding rebel, other non-state, semi-state, state and other actors, I classify as intermediate or secondary *structural concepts*; and the more elusive phenomena of actor-contemplation, like the *ends* of violence regarding drives, motives, long-term goals and short-term objectives, I classify as sub-typical or tertiary *empirical concepts*” (cited in Ten Dam 2014: 7).


Consequently, particular, temporal manifestations of violence exhibiting specific amalgams of actions, actors and motives, I deem ‘empirical concepts’ as well. To be sure, one must be mindful of *conceptual stretching* i.e. “vague, amorphous conceptualizations” (Sartori 1970: 1034) due to widening the applicability or *extension* (denotation) of terms across more and more phenomena without progressively restricting the properties or *intension* (connotation) that these phenomena supposedly possess, about which Giovanni Sartori warned against.⁸

Nevertheless, as long as actions—and actors—circumscribed as belonging to the “same genus, species, or sub-species” (Ibid: 1036) are observable i.e. empirical in the strict sense⁹, and thus researchable, testable and even quantifiable, these classified, distinguished phenomena are truly comparable. At first glance, my action-actor-motive trichotomy seems to run along Sartori’s *ladder of abstraction* (Sartori 1970: esp. 1040-41) from high-level universals (maximum extension) to medium-level classes (high extension, some intension) and low-level categories (maximum intension) (Ibid: 1041, note 28).

However, and arguably contrary to Sartori’s argument and expectation, highly “contextual” motives and amalgams of actions, actors and motives are far more elusive, i.e. less easily discernible and provable phenomena—and therefore, in that sense, less easily or incontrovertibly amenable to comparative analysis.

Brutality and brutalisation as defined by me (see Appendix) one may regard and apply as primary, universal concepts according to my action-actor-motive trichotomy, for so far these are, i.e. can be seen and detected as, observable phenomena. However, for so far local and/or international norms are contested interpretations of not-easily-detectable-and-provable motives—just like grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies—then one should regard and use these as tertiary, empirical concepts. Combat-stresses are usually behavioural responses and pathological symptoms that are observable on the ground and thus can normally be classified as primary concepts—unless stress-responses like rage are not immediately apparent or deliberately hidden from view.

I agree with Sartori that distinguishing and thus defining phenomena along observable i.e. empirical characteristics constituting singular *genera* or classes is a basic taxonomical requirement for scientific analysis in general and comparative analysis in particular. I also agree to some extent that concepts on a “low level of abstraction” (Sartori 1970: 1043) are still



amenable to comparative research, even if these are first developed through single or few-case (small-N) studies (Ibid)—and even if these concern hard-to-detect human motives.


However, I believe it is nearly impossible in practice to come up with categorised classes that are “mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive” (Sartori 1970: 1039) in the true, fullest, perfect sense—even with the best, most precise definitions on any level of abstraction. There always will be ill-classifiable grey areas and unclassifiable outliers. Still, the better the definitions, the fewer these ‘indeterminables’ will be—unless we encounter phenomena that are wholly incomprehensible to us according to contemporary knowledge; then these remain ‘unknowables’ for so long as we keep conceiving concepts that fail to capture the reality, nature and characteristics of these phenomena. Only fundamentally new concepts, explanations i.e. hypotheses and theories may ultimately capture and explain these phenomena.

Naturally, one could reverse the hierarchy, and thus “x- and y-axes” in visual representations, of the conceptual triad from an action-actor-motive to a motive-actor-action one. One could consider the *contemplations* (ends) that germinate inside people’s heads about their wishes and needs as the primary concepts, the actors who do the contemplations and/or are affected by the contemplations (and consequent acts) of others as the secondary concepts, and the *actions* (means) they undertake to satisfy or secure these wishes and needs as the tertiary concepts.

Thus a motive like revenge (usually based on a consciously felt grievance and experienced deprivation) is universal in the sense that it is an inherent human trait which may crop up at any place and point in time. In the same way particular kinds of grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies are also universal, inherent human drives that have appeared at any time, location and circumstance in the past and (may) happen at any time, location and circumstance in the present and future. In other words, such drives are the primary, universal concepts from the vantage point of the reverse motive-actor-action trichotomy. Then rebellion—as one of the many possible actions emanating from revenge or any other motive—can be seen as the empirically, temporally fluctuating phenomenon.

This often sub-conscious reversal in conceptual hierarchy by those focusing on explanatory in-depth analysis is understandable; the ends—including the internal and external factors that give rise to these ends—ought to explain the means, i.e. account for why the latter occur. It may be fine to narrowly define terrorism, rebellion and other forms or means of violence as actions irrespective of motives. Yet that still leaves the question unanswered of why certain rebellions and terrorist acts take place, what motives and social and political processes are behind these. Nevertheless, actions are relatively easy to observe and corroborate—or to refute as not happening in a certain place at a certain point in time.

One must first establish *that* or *whether* a rebellion, terrorist act or any kind of action is taking place (irrespective of one’s particular definitions, as long as one circumscribes these as actions irrespective of possible ends, motives and ideologies) before one can ever find out



why it is taking place. The *why*, and the *how*, will always be more elusive and contestable than the *what*. True, there typically is and will be plenty of disagreement about what actually happened or is happening, even when applying the best, most lucid ‘action-definitions’ of genocide, terrorism, banditry and so on. Still, imagine the even greater level of disagreement on the motives and other causes of an event, even if one could agree on the characterisation—like ‘terrorist’, ‘semi-terrorist’ or ‘non-terrorist’—of that event.

Therefore, in social reality the drives of sentient beings like us human beings are usually more elusive and fickle than the actions; contemplations are more difficult to observe (if at all) than actions. Particularly submerged urges and motives and expressed goals and priorities quickly alter over time—even more so than preferred modes of action, even if the latter may eventually expire in certain cultures (like duelling and gladiatorial games). So in that regard I generally prefer the action-actor-motive hierarchy in analytical conceptualisations above the motive-actor-action one.


Conclusion

Unfortunately, many scholars do not expressly, let alone systematically, define concepts like terrorism, nationalism, modernity, ethnicity and identity, perhaps because they believe the concepts to be either too abstract or self-evident to merit circumscription. The definitions in the Appendix are largely self-made, and based on my action-actor-motive typology, out of necessity. Indeed, identity, modernism-modernity, and traditionalism-tradition concepts do seem ill-defined in much of the anthropological and sociological literature.

Often modernity or the modern is obliquely identified with ‘dynamic’, ‘democratic’, ‘egalitarian’, ‘secular’, ‘scientific’, ‘industrial’, ‘advanced’ or ‘progressive’—in short ‘Western’. These adjectives do suggest a forward-looking mindset (see my definition), yet entail empirical regularities in the Western world, not universal characteristics across the world (Shils 1968: 7-9; see further Ten Dam 2010: 335-340).

Therefore, I define modernity and traditionalism as forward-looking and backward-looking mindsets respectively (see Appendix), that may occur in and characterise any culture, society, country, region or locality at any time or designated period in human history. In the same way, I define nationalism as a ‘timeless’ concept about any kind of secular and/or religious and/or linguistic (self-)identification by any ethnically or other large group, not bound or limited to any particular time or place.

Unlike Tomasz Polanski, I do not feel the need to apply the term ‘nationalism’ “with caution” regarding the motivations, ideologies and identities of people in ‘pre-modern’ (i.e. preindustrial) times, nor the need to follow the “modern secular usage” of the term by scholars like S. K. Eddy (Polanski 2010 (1999): 345 (quotes)).¹⁰ Indeed, nationalism is not necessarily purely secular: religious belief and ethnic identity and pride are often amalgamated into one national consciousness among peoples long before the Industrial Revolution.




Generally, it is “advisable to strive for precise, tight definitions of key concepts” (Buffachi 2005: 197). To avoid confusion and befuddlement, one should construct concepts that differentiate between universal, ‘timeless’ and actual, temporal phenomena, and if possible include in the former any potential phenomena that may occur at any point in time. Generally, I prefer to classify discernible actions as main-type concepts (e.g. ‘terrorism’), and apparent drives, motivations and ideologies accounting for these actions as sub-type concepts (e.g. ‘leftwing terrorism’, ‘Islamist terrorism’, etc.). My extensive violence typology shown in the Appendix will be regularly reviewed, improved and expanded.

Caspar ten Dam Leiden, April 2015

Endnotes

1. I will extensively discuss and defend my definitions in future publications, notably in C. ten Dam, *Conceptualising Brutality and Violence: How to Define, Grasp and Deal with Terrorism and Other Forms of Violence in a Post 11 September World* Cambridge Scholars Publishing (CSP), forthcoming.
2. From 2005 till early 2014, I have described my Brutalisation theory, with some modifications, as “a cycle of violence involving four main variables: “values on “good” and “bad” violence (variable 1); grievances leading to armed conflict (variable 2); combat stress leading to atrocities (variable 3); and new conflict grievances emanating from such atrocities (variable 4), spawning counter-atrocities and eventually hardening or debasing the original violence-values (the cycle returns to the first variable)” (Ten Dam 2010: 332). Since then, I have widened and reformulated the theory’s variables, so as to more equally represent different motivations as explanations of brutal behaviour.
3. This Series will include at least one more article: C. ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and Rebel: 4. Conflict(-Induced) Motivations among the Chechens and Albanians’ *Iran and the Caucasus* (forthcoming).
4. Here, Bell provides some lucid cross-cutting distinctions between revolutionary and non-revolutionary, guerrilla and conventional, and terrorist and non-terrorist rebel intentions, strategies and tactics (Bell 1976: 3-17), more so than in his earlier and later works (e.g. Bell 1971, 1978). Bell eventually speaks of “rebels” and “armed struggle, rather than “guerrillas” and “guerrilla-revolution” in his earlier works, though he once more interchanges and befuddles the terms ‘rebel’, ‘guerrilla’ and ‘terrorist’ in his *Dynamics of the Armed Struggle* (1998).
5. Yet in 1983 Duvall and Stohl defined terrorism as “action intended to induce sharp fear and through that agency to affect a desired outcome in a conflict situation” (Schmid & Jongman *et al.* 1988: 36), thereby following B. M. Jenkins’ assertion—which I happen to disagree with—that invariably “fear is the intended effect, not the by-product, of terrorism” (Ibid: 36).
6. As I argue in my *Conceptualising Brutality and Violence* (CSP, forthcoming), my definition of terrorism refers to any atrocious, ‘anti-civilian’ violence during the immediate act, like bomb explosions in crowded areas, not violence following upon an immediate act like a forceful arrest, such as abuses and torture after the arrest.
7. Thus I argue in my *Conceptualising Brutality and Violence* (CSP, forthcoming), that brutal actions like terrorism are *not* universally, invariably linked to only a limited number of goals and motives like revenge, the creation of fear, or the deliberate attempt to influence the behavior and policies of immediate victims or a wider audience.



8. The terms “extension” and “intension” are from Wesley C. Salmon, *Logic* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp.90-91.
9. In the strict sense, universal concepts on observable actions can be termed empirical concepts as well. However, I apply the term “empirical” as a reference to temporal, time-fluctuating phenomena—typically (though not exclusively) due to changeable human motives.
10. Polanski’s second quote from S. K. Eddy, *The King is Dead: Studies in the Near Eastern Resistance to Hellenism, 334 – 31 BC* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961, p.296.

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
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Appendix Definitions of identity and violence


© 2010, 2015 Caspar T. ten Dam With additions and improvements since 2010

Collective identity concepts

The 'modern': any mindset, norm, project or activity that is forward-looking or future-oriented, set on changing—and keep innovating—the established order, belief or custom into something new that (presumably) has never existed before in a certain dwelling, territory, country or other place. ('modernity', 'modernism')

The 'traditional': any backward-looking or past-oriented mindset/norm/project/activity set on restoring or maintaining an idealised order, belief or custom that has presumably existed in a distant past in a certain place. ('tradition', 'traditionalism')

Patriotism: the belief that it is one's duty, irrespective of one's motive—love, sense of obligation, sense of self-respect i.e. honour, or even self-interest and opportunism—to defend or otherwise maintain and secure the peace and prosperity of one's home, ranging from one's personal and family homestead to one's village or regional community, all the way up to the homeland i.e. the (nation-)state one happens to live in, not necessarily one's place of birth.



Nationalism: the belief that a nation i.e. a (supposedly) homogeneous people with common characteristics—shared history, territory, culture, religion, language, ethnicity (actual or perceived common ancestry), race, etcetera—should have its own state i.e. system of rule. When a national people attains a state, i.e. governing authority, its rights are paramount over any other people residing within its territory.

Irredentism: the belief that a nation i.e. a (supposedly) homogeneous people with common characteristics—shared history, territory, culture, language, ethnicity, etcetera—should have its own state, including territories of other, neighbouring states where (the majority of) people with the same characteristics reside. When a national people attains a state, i.e. governing authority, its rights are paramount over any other people residing within its territory.

Statism: the belief that the territory of a region, republic or any other entity should have its own state. Such a state does not necessarily have to be based on a homogeneous people of one race, ethnicity, or other common characteristic. Its citizens may belong to heterogeneous communities, yet they in principle hold the same rights of citizenship ('Expansionism': parallel to irredentism).

Generic violence concepts

Aggression: deliberate infliction of physical or psychological force perhaps accompanied with pain, other harm or coercion (force) by sentient beings on other beings for whatever end, and may be immoral and illegal i.e. violate basic human rights in the broad sense, including humanitarian law.

Violence: deliberate infliction of physical force perhaps accompanied with pain, other harm or coercion for whatever end, which may be lethal and violate basic human rights in the broad sense.

Political violence: deliberate infliction of physical force perhaps accompanied with pain, other harm or coercion for whatever end in the public arena beyond the private sphere (yet possibly with private motives) which may be lethal, and violate human rights and humanitarian law.


Conflict: fundamental disagreement between one or more actors due to opposite aims, interests, needs or grievances, which for some reason are or appear to be unsolvable or irreconcilable.

Armed conflict: violent confrontation between one or more armed actors with opposite aims, interests, needs or grievances that appear to be unsolvable or irreconcilable through non-violent means, or that one or more actors have been unwilling to resolve or settle through peaceful means.

Armed actor: any group, party, organisation or entity that for whatever reason carries lethal weaponry for violent use or threat of violent use.

Armed non-state actor: any private, non-governmental, illegal or unsanctioned group, organisation or entity beyond the control and sphere of the state that carries for whatever reason lethal weaponry for violent use or threat of violent use.

Armed state actor: any public, governmental, legal or state-sanctioned group, organisation or entity belonging directly or indirectly to the state that carries for whatever reason lethal weaponry for violent use or threat of violent use.



Concepts of violent and non-violent change

Reform: significant modification in a society, authority or state within the parameters of an existing culture i.e. set of values, norms, beliefs, rituals and life-patterns. This constitutes improvement rather than transformation, and transpires peacefully rather than violently. Yet it may occur through violence when (certain) people yearn for it and their rulers are unresponsive to it. Discontented and radical (ised) people may actively seek it through violence.

Revolution: far-reaching change of a society, authority or state involving drastic alteration in a culture i.e. set of values, norms, beliefs, rituals and life-patterns (Variation: drastic change that significantly alters or radically transforms a society, state and/or its political system, which almost intrinsically involves a change in culture (values, norms, rituals, life-patterns, etcetera). This transformation may occur violently or peacefully, or may be actively sought by violent or non-violent means.

Protest: public demonstration of dissatisfaction or defiance on an issue deemed or experienced as unfair, unjust or intolerable, expressed silently or loudly, disciplined or rowdy, peacefully or violently (sit-ins, marches, strikes, riots, etc.), that may amount or lead to peaceful resistance or armed rebellion.

Main forms of violent conflict between different or similar kinds of actors

War: armed conflict with one or more opposing parties fighting in such a way as to achieve complete victory over or utter defeat of the other (enemy, opponent), as evident from the type and scale of fighting methods, tactics and strategies employed.

Interstate or external armed conflict: violent confrontation between the armed forces of two or more states or governments that represent them, due to actually or seemingly irreconcilable aims, interests, needs or grievances.


Intrastate, internal, or domestic armed conflict: violent confrontation due to actually or seemingly irreconcilable aims, interests, needs or grievances between one or more armed non-state actors and the state, or among (quasi-)state actors in 'civil conflicts' and among non-state actors in 'absent states' and 'failed states'.

Civil conflict: intrastate, internal, or domestic conflict in which the main opposing parties represent and control populations, infrastructures and other assets sufficient to fulfil state-like functions, signifying a conflict between state, semi-state, 'partial-state' or 'counter-state' actors.

Civil war: civil conflict in which one or more opposing parties capable of state(-like) functions fight in such a way as to achieve complete victory over or utter defeat of their opponents, as evident from the type and scale of fighting methods, tactics and strategies employed.

Rebellion or insurgency: armed conflict by one or more non-state, semi-state or alternative-state actors against any entrenched and generally recognised ruler, elite, authority, government, regime or state, for whatever personal reasons (grievance, grudge, greed, etc.), goals or ideologies.

Revolt or uprising: spontaneous rebellion by individuals or groups, with little or no planning, instigation or involvement of political parties or other entities (at least not in the initial or early phases), possibly but not necessarily arising from riots and other disturbances.



Insurrection: planned rebellion by individuals or groups belonging to political parties or other entities, possibly but not necessarily arising from revolts, riots and other outbursts of violence.

Coup d'état: focused insurrection that attempts to immediately grab and gain control over the reigns of power of the state, possibly but not necessarily through small-scale, speedy operations to capture government buildings and other vital objects.

Main methods of violence in tactics and fighting techniques

Conventional or regular conflict: violent confrontation between state and/or non-state forces whereby at least one side or party attempts to gain physical, visible and stable control of (the other's) territory and fixed objects, as evident from the fighting methods employed, typically but not necessarily via heavily armed forces on or across battlefields.

Unconventional or irregular conflict: violent confrontation whereby one or more of the parties do not seek or need to hold (the opponent's) territory or fixed objects, as evident from non-territory-occupying fighting methods like sabotage, diversion, ambush or interference of communications.

Guerrilla: unconventional conflict (or tactic) based on flexible, irregular fighting methods with hit-and-run tactics ranging from sabotage to ambush without aim or the need to hold on to territory or fixed objects, typically but not necessarily by lightly armed individuals or small units.

Main means of violence that violate or tend to violate international and/or local norms

Brutality: violation of international and/or local norms of justified violence and those norms guarding the life, health and integrity of the person, particularly through ill-treatment, torture, killing, imprisonment and execution without trial or due process; international norms and local norms or violence-values may differ on what kinds of violence are deemed justified against which persons for what reasons and under what circumstances.


Brutalisation: the process of increasing violations over time, both in severity and scale, of international and/or local norms of violence and those norms guarding the life, health and integrity of the person.

Terrorism: sudden lethal violence without preceding warning of the act for whatever purpose against (groups of) unarmed or weakly armed and thereby effectively defenceless civilians, unarmed off-duty security personnel, soldiers and policemen, and other defenceless non-combatants.

'Terrorisation': the process of increasing resort to terrorism over time, both in severity and scale.

Liquidation, or 'terrorist assassination': sudden lethal violence without preceding warning of the act for whatever purpose against selected individuals who are totally or practically unarmed and unprotected, like ordinary civilians who cannot defend themselves or afford bodyguards and other security personnel.

Assassination: sudden lethal violence without preceding warning of the act for whatever purpose against selected individuals who are armed or protected by bodyguards and/or other security personnel, like politicians, generals and community leaders—who thus in principle are able to defend themselves or to be defended by others (even in surprise attacks).



Criminality, or Crime: any violent or non-violent act or activity prohibited and punishable by law, directed for whatever reason—not necessarily out of greed—against persons and properties that result in moneys and valuables being illegally and illicitly taken or earned.

Criminalisation: the process of increasing resort to crime over time, both in severity and scale.

Gangsterism: violent criminality out of greed or any other purpose, that is any violent act or activity which illegally and illicitly takes, collects or earns moneys, (from) peoples, goods and properties.

Banditry: gangsterism that resorts to robbery i.e. forceful taking of moneys, peoples and goods for whatever reason through use or threat of lethal violence, involving plunder, kidnapping and kindred acts, by using guerrilla or other irregular tactics, often though not necessarily in mountainous, wooded, inhospitable, urban and other terrains suited for such tactics.

Brigandry, or Brigandage: banditry in the context of rebellion, whereby (certain) rebels act like or operate as bandits, or (certain) bandits turn into rebels i.e. join the rebellion for whatever reason, and (continue to) resort to pillage, ransom and other violently criminal acts through guerrilla(-like) tactics.

Norms, motives and behaviours that may or may not (tend to) violate international and/or local norms (these do increasingly violate such norms according to the Brutalisation theory)


Violence-value: any norm of right i.e. 'proper', 'good' and 'justified' violence vis-à-vis wrong i.e. 'improper', 'bad' or 'unjustified' violence, like those of honour and restraint, hospitality including fair treatment of captured opponents and enemies, proportionality and non-combatant immunity; in short, any notable, distinguishable and (most) significant local and/or international norm of justified violence and those guarding the life, health and integrity of the person.

Grievance: protest, complaint or lament of a past or present injustice i.e. international and/or local-norm violation of one or more individual and collective rights, regarding one or more deprivations (sufferings) ranging from poverty, discrimination and other hardships to repression, genocide and other atrocities.

Greed or Avarice: desire to (m)attain wealth, status, power and privileges for oneself, one's family, friends and supporters or a wider group (clan, tribe, ethnies, nation, etc.) one feels one belongs to or feels entitled to protect or enhance, to the detriment of others (if not necessarily or automatically detrimental to others: an *interest*); these ends one seeks and tries to maintain through either or both legal and illegal means, like deprecations (extortion, stealing, robbery, plunder, etc.), whereby legal means may be 'unjust', discriminatory and/or other draconian laws formalising the deprecations to the advantage of a certain group or a few individuals.

Ideology: a belief system that contains a set of principles, convictions and objectives that are orally and/or scripturally expressed and transmitted for and to actual and potential followers or opponents, to achieve secular and/or religious goals like a pious community, a just society, democracy or independence to redress hardships, sufferings and other injustices (grievances) and/or further individual and/or collective interests ('greeds' or avarices if these inherently disadvantage others), or to change the present situation irrespective of or without any 'greeds', interests and grievances.

Combat-stress: one or more stress-responses like shock, fear, fatigue, rage and consequent trauma among one or more fighters, soldiers, rebels or other (kinds of) combatants prior to, during and after



battles and other high-risk operations. Such stress may lead to atrocities induced by innate aggression (eagerness to use violence) or—paradoxically—by innate restraint (reluctance to use violence), with social pressures of group convictions, bondings and expectations, typically enhanced through military training, indoctrination and conditioning, to either carry out and condone atrocities or restrain from and punish such atrocities.

(Announcement)



The Central Asia Program at George Washington University is happy to announce the launch of the [Central Asian Analytical Network](http://www.caa-network.org/) (CAAN)

<http://www.caa-network.org/>

CAAN is a new, integrated platform designed to increase Central Asian citizens' access to objective information and analysis. CAAN provides factual information and critical thinking in Russian and in the national languages of Central Asia on domestic and global affairs. The Network connects various communities of producers of information and analysis - professional journalists, social activists, bloggers, experts, and scholars, by using the already existing human capital that has been built up over the last two decades in the region.

This project is the achievement of a group of young scholars and experts from Central Asia who are tired of hearing only Western-or Russian, or Chinese-observers discussing what is happening in their countries. They want to have their own voices taken into account. They believe that a young generation of Central Asians are ready to participate fully in the debate about the future of the region. They think that a plurality of opinions is welcome, and that regional dialogue is not only possible but needed. In the current context, where local voices do not reach Western capitals and local production is dominated by frameworks formulated outside the region-whether in Moscow, in Washington, in Beijing or in Syria-CAAN finally returns the region to itself.

Information is not a mere succession of raw data devoid of sense, but is informed by critical thinking, and augmented analysis. This is the entire stake around which CAAN revolves: to enable critical thinking to emerge and flourish among young Central Asians, in order to aid them in understanding the world, their region, their countries, use this understanding to articulate their own opinions.

The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), www.ieres.org